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Background on KAD
KAD is :
• A fully distributed P2P network (Kademlia DHT)
• Used for file sharing
• Implemented by open source clients (eMule and aMule)
• Widely deployed (∼3 millions simultaneous users)
KAD DHT used to index keywords & files :
• KAD ID : place of a peer in the DHT (128 random bits)
• target (content) ID : MD5(keyword) or MD5(file)
• prefix = number of common bits between a peer & a content
Type ID prefix
target ID 477221265829086C74988C40EFE63DAF -
peer ID 477229E3D7CFC729F337ABBB69C983C6 20 bits
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The KAD DHT
Fig.: Double indexation mechanism used to publish contents
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Exploiting KAD Search
Despite recent protective rules, localized attacks are possible :
• Each peer is free to chose its KADID
• Very efficient KAD Search procedure ”store to the closest
peers possible”
• Place few distributed peers close to the targetID (Sybil attack)
• Honeypeers attract all the 10 replicated ”service” requests
Fig.: The Honeynet eclipsing content
6 / 23
Introduction Analysis of IDs distribution DHT attacks detection & mitigation Conclusion
Motivation
Such attack raises :
• privacy issues (attackers monitoring shared contents)
• denial of service issues (eclipse attack removing information
from the DHT)
• security issues (fake files and sources insertion : pollution,
malware diffusion)
Protecting the KAD network is very challenging :
• fully distributed design
• strong need of backward compatibility between clients
• no existing solution is suitable (central authority,
crypto-puzzles, social networks, distributed certification)
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Efficient Pollution
Fig.: Result of a search for ”spiderman” under eclipse and poison (4 fake
files)
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Key Idea
Instead of controlling peer IDs :
• let them randomly choose their ID...
• but check if IDs distributions are really random !
To target an ID, DHT attacks introduce :
• proximity abnormalities in IDs distribution
• density abnormalities in IDs distribution
Type KADID prefix
content 477221265829086C74988C40EFE63DAF -
attacker 477221265829086C74988C4070D6E0F1 96 bits
normal 477229E3D7CFC729F337ABBB69C983C6 20 bits
Tab.: Example of IDs
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Theoretical IDs distribution
Mean number of peers sharing at least x bits with a target ID with





with N = 4× 106 and x ∈ [1; 128].
Fig.: Mean number of peers sharing a given prefix with a target
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Real IDs distribution
Real network measurement :
• 1800 lookups on safe (random) DHT entries
• for each lookup : what are the prefixes of the 10 best peers
found ?
Fig.: Average Prefix distribution of the 10 best found contacts
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Real IDs distribution
Results show :
• KAD lookup procedure is efficient enough to give a
representative view of the closest peers possible.
• The theoretical random ID distribution (geometric distribution
with parameter 1/2) is sufficient to characterize the results
obtained in a real lookup process.
Moreover, IDs distribution is stable : all tested parameters do
not affect it
• time spent in the P2P network
• distance between the publishing peer and the published data
• type of published information (keyword or file)
• type of requested services (publish or search)
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Preventive rules
IP address limitation
• service requests must be sent to peers from different
subnetwork
• already applied to filter peers inserted in routing table
• distribute a DHT entry on the IP network scale
Discarding close nodes
• currently prefixes ≥ 28 bits very unlikely
• change the tolerance zone from [8 ;128] to [8 ;28]
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DHT attack detection
Major difficulty :
• few (10) best peers constitute a very small sample size
• common statistic tools comparing distributions (chi-square,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov) inefficient
• KL-divergence efficient but must be interpreted
Kullback-Leibler divergence (G-test) to detect attacks :







Prefix 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
M (attack) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0
M (safe) 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T 1/2 1/22 1/23 1/24 1/25 1/26 1/27 1/28 1/29 1/210 1/211
Tab.: Distributions compared with KL-distance to detect attacks
16 / 23
Introduction Analysis of IDs distribution DHT attacks detection & mitigation Conclusion
DHT attacks detection
Evaluation of the detection metric & threshold :
• 2 data sets : simulated attack distributions vs real DHT dist.
• the few false negatives are not dangerous attacks : few peers
inserted (5 or less) on low prefixes (18-19 bits)
• detection
threshold = 0.7
• false positives &
negatives < 9%
17 / 23
Introduction Analysis of IDs distribution DHT attacks detection & mitigation Conclusion
DHT attacks mitigation
When an attack is detected :
• countermeasures progressively filter the attacked prefixes
• while the distribution is not ’safe’, remove peers with the
most suspicious prefix, update distribution and distance
• peers with lower prefixes (< 18 bits) fill the left places among
the 10 best






Tab.: Best remaining contacts with prefix under 18bits
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DHT attacks mitigation
• countermeasure removes almost all malicious peers
• safe threshold defines the countermeasure tolerance
Fig.: Average number of contacts removed among the 10-best by the
countermeasure
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Full defense scheme
Fig.: Full defense scheme applied to KAD
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Is the KAD network really threatened ?
Yes ! local attacks are running
Simple test :
• choose few ”well-known” keywords
• launch DHT lookups


















Introduction Analysis of IDs distribution DHT attacks detection & mitigation Conclusion
Outline
Introduction
Analysis of IDs distribution
DHT attacks detection & mitigation
Conclusion
22 / 23
Introduction Analysis of IDs distribution DHT attacks detection & mitigation Conclusion
Conclusion
Our solution :
• is efficient ; introduces no overhead
• provides full backward compatibility
• can be applied to any DHT with iterative routing and
replicated data
Future (current) work :
• crawl the KAD DHT to detect real attacks
• evaluate the implementation
• dynamically set the detection parameters
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How to simulate attack distributions
• initialize with nodes following the observed average
distribution of prefixes
• add different configurations of malicious nodes
• recompute final distribution of the ’10 best contacts’
# of malicious # of prefixes Repartition of # of generated
peers inserted targeted the peers distributions
5 1 5 11
5 3 2-2-1 8
5 5 1-1-1-1-1 6
10 1 10 11
10 2 7-3 9
10 2 5-5 9
10 3 5-3-2 8
10 4 4-3-2-1 7
10 5 4-2-2-1-1 6
10 6 2-2-2-2-1-1 5
10 7 2-2-2-1-1-1-1 4
10 10 1-1-1-1-1-...-1 2
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Countermeasure Algorithm
Input: contact list [ ] ; prefixes distribution [ ] ; KL increments [ ] ;
KL div ; max div ;
Output: updated contact list [ ]
foreach prefix in prefixes distribution do
KL increments.add(partial KL div(prefix));
end
KL div = SUM(KL increments);
while KL div > max div AND MAX (KL increments) > 0 do
prefix=KL increments.index(MAX(KL increments));
remove contacts(contact list, prefix);
remove distance(KL increments, prefix);
KL div=SUM(KL increments);
end
Algorithm 1: Countermeasure to mitigate DHT attacks
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